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Abstract
We propose causal agency models for representing and reason-
ing about ethical dilemmas. We find that ethical dilemmas, al-
though they appear similar on the surface, differ in their formal
structure. Based on their structural properties, as identified by
the causal agency models, we cluster a set of dilemmas in Type
1 and Type 2 dilemmas. We observe that for Type 1 dilemmas
but not for Type 2 dilemmas a utilitarian action does not domi-
nate the possibility of refraining from action thereby constitut-
ing a conflict. Hence, we hypothesize, based on the model, that
Type 1 dilemmas are perceived as more difficult than Type 2
dilemmas by human reasoners. A behavioral study where par-
ticipants rated the difficulty of dilemmas supports the models’
predictions.
Keywords: Moral Reasoning; Moral Complexity; Moral
Dilemmas; Causal Agency Models; Ethical Principles
Introduction
Currently, we experience a hot debate on moral reasoning and
artificial intelligence (AI). In one respect, the discussion is
about how to apply AI technology morally. In another re-
spect, there is a requirement to enable AI technology itself to
make moral decisions. Fields of application are self-driving
cars (Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2016), robots navigat-
ing in social environments (Lindner, 2015), and even robots
that give moral advice (Lindner & Bentzen, 2017). As a con-
sequence, new research areas such as machine ethics (Allen,
Wallach, & Smit, 2006) and moral human-robot interaction
(Malle, Scheutz, Arnold, Voiklis, & Cusimano, 2015) arise.
To address the requirement for autonomous moral decision
making, we recently introduced a software library for model-
ing hybrid ethical reasoning agents (short: HERA)1 (Lindner
& Bentzen, 2017). The goal of the HERA project is to pro-
vide theoretically well-founded and practically usable logic-
based machine ethics tools for implementation in artificial
moral agents such as (social) robots and software bots. To
align human moral reasoning with moral reasoning by ma-
chines, our development of formal models and algorithms is
informed by moral psychology and moral philosophy. We
aim for the integration of various theories about human moral
development, moral reasoning, and ethics.
There are several approaches to explain human moral rea-
soning. Kohlberg (1984), whose approach is based on Pi-
aget’s “genetic epistemology” claimed that individuals are
passing through six invariant and universal stages in the de-
velopment of moral reasoning. Reaching the next stage rep-
1http://www.hera-project.com
resents a qualitative advance in the ability to make consis-
tent and differentiated judgments concerning moral norms
and principles. Conversely, the theory of moral reasoning ad-
vocated by Mikhail (2007) assumes that there is moral gram-
mar triggering certain moral judgments. He hypothesizes two
rules for the grammar: the norm prohibiting intentional bat-
tery as a means, and the norm of double effect valuating bat-
tery as side effect. The research by Greene, Sommerville,
Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001); Haidt (2001) claims a
prevalence of emotionally based moral intuition. Greene and
Haidt (2002) are moving away from moral reasoning tending
towards moral judgments caused by immediate affective in-
tuitions and emotions. Greene et al. (2001) advanced the dual
process model of moral judgment. They assume competi-
tive moral subsystems in the brain resp. moral reasoning that
is influenced by the mutual interaction and competition be-
tween two distinct psychological systems: (1) the emotional,
intuitive, deontological judgment system and (2) the rational,
calculated, utilitarian judgment system.
Throughout the literature, various hypothetical moral
dilemmas are used to investigate questions concerning hu-
man morality, moral reasoning and moral judgments. We will
make use of four dilemmas:
1. Runaway Trolley Dilemma A runaway trolley is about to
run over and kill five people. If a bystander throws a switch
then the trolley will turn onto a sidetrack, where it will kill
only one person.
2. Pregnancy Dilemma A pregnant woman is about to give
birth to her triplets. If the doctors treat the woman then her
triplets will live, but she will die. Otherwise, the triplets
will die, but the life of the pregnant women will be saved.
3. Boat Dilemma A boat is about to sink because of over-
weight. If the crew is told to throw the biggest person into
the sea then the boat will not sink and the other three pas-
sengers will be saved (but the big person will die).
4. Hijacked Airplane Dilemma An airplane was hijacked by
terrorists, and the terrorists threaten to crash the airplane
against a populated area on the ground. If the military
shoots the airplane the passengers will die but the airplane
will crash in a deserted area thus not harming anyone else.
Several ways of classifying dilemmas and different moral
reasoners have been proposed: Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley, and Cohen (2004) differentiate between personal
dilemmas and impersonal dilemmas. Among subjects, com-
monly more deontological judgments are produced with per-
sonal dilemmas, while impersonal dilemmas commonly pro-
duce consequentialist judgments (Moll & de Oliveira-Souza,
2007). Crockett (2013) proposes a model-based system for
consequentialist reasoning: The reasoner evaluates the best
outcome of an action by starting from the current action and
searching through a decision tree. In the model-free evalu-
ation, which is associated with deontological reasoning, the
forward searching is not activated. Shou and Song (2015)
found that most of their subjects, irrespective of whether they
chose a deontological decision or a consequentialist deci-
sion, evaluated consequences when information about out-
come probabilities was provided. Wiegmann and Waldmann
(2014) propose that the moral dilemmas’ underlying causal
structure supports moral intuition and thus is an important
factor for the moral judgments humans make.
Thus, we observe that research has been focused on the ef-
fects of content and structure of moral dilemmas on human
moral judgments. Our research focus is on moral complex-
ity and adds evidence for how structural properties of moral
dilemmas affect their perceived difficulty. The paper is struc-
tured as follows: First, we introduce causal agency models
as a tool for representing moral dilemmas in terms of causes
and utilities. Second, we define ethical principles within this
framework. Third, the four aforementioned moral dilemmas
are modeled using causal agency models. Based on struc-
tural commonalities and differences of these models, we dis-
tinguish two dilemma types, which we term Type 1 and Type
2 dilemmas. We hypothesize that Type 1 dilemmas are more
difficult to solve for humans than Type 2 dilemmas. Fourth,
we present an empirical study which shows that our model
predicts human ratings about the perceived difficulty for the
two types of moral dilemmas.
Causal Agency Models
Ethical principles can be modeled as specifications of moral
permissibility in causal agency models. Causal agency mod-
els are extensions of causal models that are used for counter-
factual reasoning about causality, responsibility, blame, and
related concepts (Halpern, 2016). In our HERA framework,
an ethical principle is represented as a logical formula whose
truth determines which actions are permissible according to
the principle and which are not. Actions and their con-
sequences are modeled as directed acyclic graphs showing
causal influence. At the root of the graph will be actions and
other independent variables influencing consequences further
down the graph. Boolean structural equations capture all the
information about the causal relationship between variables.
For instance, to model that the trolley from the Runway Trol-
ley Dilemma will turn onto a sidetrack when the bystander
throws the switch, we may write the boolean structural equa-
tion turn := throw. The boolean variable turn will be true in
the model whenever the boolean variable throw is true in the
model. The set of boolean structural equations in a model is
called a causal mechanism. The truth assignment of the root
node of the graph is called a world or an option. Formally,
we define causal agency models as follows:
Definition 1 (Causal Agency Models)
A (boolean) causal agency model, M, is a tuple 〈U = A∪
B,C,F,u,W 〉, where, A = {a1, . . . ,am} is a nonempty finite set
of propositional variables called the actions. B= {b1, . . . ,bk}
is a (possibly empty) finite set of propositional variables
called the background variables. Together the actions and
background variables are the exogenous variables as defined
above. C = {c1, . . . ,cn} is a finite (possibly empty) set of
propositional variables called the endogenous variables. F
is a causal mechanism explained above. u : literals→ Z is a
utility function assigning an integer value to each literal. W
is a set of boolean interpretations of (A∪B).
We assume some familiarity on the part of the reader with
classical propositional logic (and (∧), or (∨), not (¬), and
so on) and of truth functional semantics. A formula con-
taining variables such as (c1 ∧ a1), is intended to mean that
consequence c1 and action a1 both obtain. We write M,wi |=
(c1 ∧ a1) for (c1 ∧ a1) is true with option wi (or at world wi)
in the model M. Apart from propositional formulas we need
simple arithmetic formulas expressing the utility of literals.
We write u(vi) = z, for an integer z, with the intended mean-
ing that the utility of vi is z, similarly we write u(vi) ≥ u(v j)
for the utility of vi is equal to or greater than the utility of v j.
We extend the utility function to conjunctions of literals by
addition of the utilities of the conjuncts. The utility of other
formulas (e.g., disjunctions) is undefined.
Ethical Principles
Causal agency models play the role of representations of situ-
ations involving moral decisions. We now define ethical prin-
ciples according to which moral permissibility of actions can
be assessed based on the actions’ consequences. For the fol-
lowing discussion, the principle of act-utilitarianism and the
notion of Pareto dominance are of particular importance.
The utilitarian principle focuses on consequences of ac-
tions. It states that an agent ought to perform the action
among the available alternatives with the overall maximal
utility. We adopt an act-utilitarian interpretation which does
not distinguish between doing and allowing, i.e., the causal
structure of the situation is not taken into account. Thus the
action which the agent ought to perform is the one which
leads to the best possible situation, i.e., the highest utility,
regardless of what the agent causes and intends.
Definition 2 (Utilitarian Permissibility)
Let w0, ...,wn be the available options, and conswi =
{c |M,wi |= c} be the set of consequences and their nega-
tions that obtain with these options. An option wp is per-
missible according to the utilitarian principle if and only if
none of its alternatives yield more overall utility, i.e., M,wi |=
u(
∧
conswp)≥ u(
∧
conswi) holds for all wwi .
The utilitarian principle allows that an action brings about
some bad consequences if it at the same time brings about
more good consequences. For instance, it allows sacrificing
some people if this sacrifice serves the good of many people.
As an alternative to utilitarian permissibility we introduce the
principle of Pareto permissibility. To this end, we first define
the notion of Pareto dominance, which allows us to conclude
that some action brings about a negative outcome in some
respect, although it may be the optimal action from an utili-
tarian point of view. An option wa dominates another option
wb if and only if wa is no worse in any aspect compared to wb,
and wa improves at least one aspect of wb either by making
more good consequences obtain or less bad consequences ob-
tain. Thus the agent does not change the world for the worse
and will change it for the better by choosing the dominant
action instead of the dominated one.
Definition 3 (Pareto Dominance)
Let w0,w1 be two available options, let cons
good
wi =
{c |M,wi |= c∧ u(c) > 0} be the set of good consequences
of option wi, cons
good
wi = {c |M,wi |= ¬c∧ u(c) > 0} the set
of good consequences that does not obtain in option wi, and
consbadwi = {c |M,wi |= c∧u(c)≤ 0} the bad consequences of
option wi. Option w0 dominant option w1 if and only if the
following conditions hold: 1) w0 shares all the good con-
sequences with w1 (M,w0 |= ∧consgoodw1 ), 2) w0 either has
at least one good consequence that does not hold in w1, or
w1 has at least one bad consequence that does not hold in
w0(M,w0 |= ∨consgoodw1 or M,w0 |= ¬∧consbadw1 ), and 3) all
the bad consequences of w0 are also bad consequences of w1
(M,w1 |=∧consbadw0 ).
Based on Pareto dominance, Pareto permissibility is de-
fined. Pareto permissibility permits options not dominated by
other options. Pareto permissibility can thus be understood
as a principle of moral rationality: If there is an option that
is better in all aspects compared to an alternative, then the
only rational choice is to choose the better one. It would be
irrational (and thus impermissible) to choose the worse alter-
native.
Definition 4 (Pareto Permissibility)
Let w1, ...,wn be the set of options available to an agent. Op-
tion wi is permissible according to the Pareto principle if and
only if it is not dominated by some option w j.
As will become apparent below, utilitarian permissibility
and Pareto permissibility predict the same set of permissible
actions for some dilemmas and different sets of permissible
actions for other dilemmas. Generally, actions permissible
from the utilitarian point of view are also permissible from
the Pareto point of view. But the converse does not hold: For
some dilemmas, the set of actions permitted by each principle
differ. In those cases of disagreement the moral reasoner has
to solve a conflict.
Models of Moral Dilemmas
In this section, the four dilemmas presented in the introduc-
tion are modeled within the framework of causal agency mod-
els. Commonalities and differences are discussed both with
respect to representation and ethical reasoning.
Representations
Consider the Runaway Trolley dilemma (cf., p.1). We model
this situation from the perspective of the bystander, who faces
the decision to either throw the switch or to refrain from do-
ing so. Let a1 be the action variable representing the action of
throwing the switch, and a2 be the action variable represent-
ing refraining from throwing the switch. The consequence
variable c1 represents that the one person on the other track
dies, and the consequence variable c2 represents that the five
persons on the current track die. The causal mechanism is
expressed by structural equation in the following way: The
structural equation c1 := a1 states that throwing the switch
brings about the death of the one person on the other track,
and the structural equation c2 := ¬a1 states that not throwing
the switch will bring about the death of the other five persons.
We assign utilities u(c1) = −1 and u(c2) = −5 to the conse-
quences reflecting the number of deaths. For the lucky case
that c1 or c2 do not obtain, we assume positive consequences,
viz., u(¬c1) = 1 and u(¬c2) = 5. (One could argue that it is
also appropriate to set u(¬c1) = u(¬c2) = 0, because survival
does not improve the persons’ current state of being alive. On
the other hand, to escape from danger intuitively bears pos-
itive utility. We consider this question as another empirical
question that is out of the scope of this paper. For now it is
important to note our findings do not depend on this choice.)
We consider now the Pregnancy dilemma and model the
situation from the perspective of the doctor, wo faces the de-
cision to either treat the woman or to refrain from doing so.
Thus, we are assuming two actions a1, treating the woman,
and a2, refraining from treating the woman. Moreover, we
introduce consequence c1 representing that the woman dies,
and consequence c2 representing that the triplets die. The
structural equations are c1 := a1 and c2 := ¬a1. The utilities
are set in accordance with the number of dying individuals:
u(c1) = −1 and u(c2) = −3. As with the first dilemma, we
assume that not dying yields positive utility, and hence we set
u(¬c1) = 1 and u(¬c2) = 3.
Note that the Pregnancy dilemma is structurally isomor-
phic to the Runaway dilemma, i.e., the dilemmas can be
mapped to each other. The only difference is the number of
deaths in case of inaction (3 versus 5). Hence, we do not
expect big differences regarding the complexity of reasoning
about these dilemmas.
The Boat dilemma is modeled from the perspective of the
crew, that has to decide whether to throw the biggest person
into the sea. We assume two actions a1, throwing the biggest
person into the sea, and a2, refraining from doing so. In con-
trast to the two previous dilemmas, it would be incorrect to
model this dilemma as a choice between the one dying be-
cause of performing a1 and the other three dying because of
refraining from action. Instead, the model has to capture that
the biggest person will die in both cases, viz., either because
of being thrown into the sea or by drowning together with his
colleagues because of the sinking ship. To represent this situ-
ation appropriately, we assume three consequences: the ship
sinks (c1), the biggest person dies (c2), and the three other
passengers die (c3). The structural equations are c1 := ¬a1
(the ship will sink if the biggest person is not thrown into the
see), c2 := a1∨c1 (the biggest person will die if she is thrown
into the sea or if the ship sinks), and c3 := c1 (the three other
passengers will die if the ship sinks). The utilities again re-
flect the number of deaths: u(c2) = −1 and u(c3) = −3, and
as with the other two principles we assume that u(¬c2) = 1
and u(¬c3) = 3.
The Hijacked Airplane dilemma again is isomorphic to the
Boat dilemma. It can thus be modeled accordingly: a1 refers
to the action of shooting the airplane, and a2 to refraining
from doing so. Consequence c1 represents the airplane crash-
ing, c2 represents the death of the passengers, and c3 corre-
sponds to the death of people on the ground. The utilities can
be set to any values such that u(c2)> u(c3).
Ethical Reasoning
The ethical principles “utilitarian permissibility” and “Pareto
permissibility” defined above can now be applied to the out-
lined models of the four moral dilemmas. The first observa-
tion is that according to utilitarian permissibility taking action
(a1) is permissible and refraining from action (a2) is imper-
missible in all four dilemmas, i.e., it is obligatory to throw the
switch, to treat the woman, to throw the biggest crew mem-
ber into the sea, and to shoot the hijacked airplane. This is
rather easy to see by considering the sums of the utilities.
E.g., throwing the switch in the Runaway Trolley dilemma
yields utility u(c1∧¬c2) =−1+5 = 4 whereas not throwing
the switch yields u(¬c1∧ c2) = 1−5 =−4.
For the Runaway Trolley dilemma and the Pregnancy
dilemma, performing action a1 does not dominate refraining
from action (a2) according to the definition of Pareto domi-
nance. To see this, note that consgoodwa2 = {¬c1} (i.e., the good
thing about not throwing the switch is that the one person
will not die, and the good thing about not treating the woman
is that the woman will not die) but M,wa1 6|= ¬c1 (i.e., the
one person will die in case of throwing the switch, and the
woman will die in case of treatment). Conversely, using ex-
actly the same argument refraining from action does not dom-
inate acting. Thus, no matter how one decides someone will
be harmed who will not be harmed under the alternative op-
tion. Because no action is dominated by the other, both the
actions are permissible according to Pareto permissibility.
For the Boat dilemma and the Hijacked Airplane dilemma,
performing action a1 is the only Pareto permissible choice.
The reason is that drowning the biggest person and shoot-
ing the airplane dominate the respective alternatives. Note
that wa1 dominates wa2 according to the definition of Pareto
dominance: First, observe that consgoodwa2 = /0 (i.e., refrain-
ing from action yields no positive consequences), consgoodwa2 ={¬c2,¬c3} (i.e., when refraining from action none of the pos-
itive consequences hold), and consbadwa1 = {c2} (i.e., the nega-
tive consequence of a1 is that the biggest person dies resp.
the passenger die). Second, verify that indeed M,wa1 |= >
(satisfying condition 1 of the definition of Pareto dominance,
all the good consequences of refraining are also good conse-
quences of throwing, viz., there are none), M,wa1 |= ¬c2 ∨
¬c3 (satisfying condition 2 of the definition of Pareto dom-
inance, throwing (shooting) yields one of the good conse-
quences not yielded by refraining, viz., ¬c3), and M,wa2 |= c2
(satisfying condition 3 of the definition of Pareto dominance,
the bad consequences of throwing (shooting) is also a bad
consequence of refraining).
To sum up, for the isomorphic pair Runway Trolley
dilemma and Pregnancy dilemma, both taking action and re-
fraining are Pareto permissible but only the former is permit-
ted by the utilitarian principle. Thus, the two principles are in
conflict. For the isomorphic pair Boat dilemma and Hijacked
Airplane dilemma, the two principles agree on only permit-
ting taking action.
Type 1 and Type 2 Dilemmas
Our formal investigations suggest that the moral dilemmas we
are considering can be classified based on their formal prop-
erties. All the considered dilemmas are constituted by the
choice between a big sacrifice as a consequence of inaction
or a smaller sacrifice as a consequence of action. However,
in case of the Runaway Trolley and the Pregnancy dilemma,
the sets of negatively affected people are disjoint, whereas in
case of the Boat dilemma and the Hijacked Airplane dilemma,
the set of negatively affected people as a consequence of ac-
tion is a subset of the set of negatively affected people as a
consequence of inaction. This analysis yields that putting
other people in danger by saving some raises moral conflicts,
whereas saving a subset of people in danger does less so.
We take this difference to be a justification for subsuming
dilemmas of the Runaway Trolley and Pregnancy dilemma
type under Type 1 dilemmas, and dilemmas of the Boat and
Hijacked Airplane type under Type 2 dilemmas. We conjec-
ture that the utilitarian choice does Pareto dominate the alter-
native option in case of Type 2 dilemmas whereas it does not
in Type 1 dilemmas. Thus, for Type 1 dilemmas, ethical prin-
ciples predict different sets of permissible actions, and hence
there is a conflict to resolve which is not present for Type 2
dilemmas. We therefore hypothesize that Type 2 dilemmas
are easier to solve for humans, and we present a study which
confirms our hypothesis.
Hypotheses
The above theoretical analysis predicts that Type 2
dilemmas—due to the absence of a moral conflict—are easier
to solve than Type 1 dilemmas. These considerations lead to
two testable hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Type 1 dilemmas such as the Pregnancy and
the Runaway Trolley dilemma are rated as equally difficult.
• Hypothesis 2: Type 2 dilemmas such as the Boat dilemma
and Hijacked Airplane dilemma are rated as significantly
easier to solve than Type 1 dilemmas.
Both hypotheses can be formally justified: The Type 1
dilemmas Pregnancy and Runaway Trolley are isomorphic,
i.e., each one can be mapped to the other conserving the
structure of the problem. Hypothesis 2 is justified for Type
2 dilemmas, as the utilitarian optimum dominates the possi-
bility of refraining from action. This does not hold for Type
1 dilemmas. These hypotheses are investigated in the next
section experimentally.
Experiment
We report the second part of an experiment that focuses on
rating the difficulty of moral dilemmas.
Methods
Participants Participants were recruited on the online plat-
form Amazon Mechanical Turk and received a monetary
compensation for their participation. A total of 60 partici-
pants (f = 33) completed the study (Mage = 40.7, SDage =
8.86, minage = 21, maxage = 70). 33% of the participants re-
ported to have finished high school or college, 12% stated to
have an associate degree, 32% reported to have a bachelor de-
gree while 23% stated to have a master or a higher academic
degree.
Procedure, Design and Materials After the introduction
to the setting participants received three problems. Each
problem consisted of brief descriptions of two moral dilemas
(c.f., Bucciarelli, Khemlani, & Johnson-Laird, 2008), both
presented at the same time on the left or the right part of the
screen. Participant had to decide which of these two moral
decision situations was more difficult to make, given that they
should aim for saving lifes. More precisely, the participants
had to decide between the Pregnancy and Runaway Trolley
Dilemma, the Pregnancy and Boat Dilemma, and the Run-
away Trolley and Boat Dilemma. Hence, participants were
making a binary decision that was encoded in a dichotomous
variable. After selecting the more difficult scenario the par-
ticipants had to rate the perceived difficulty on a scale from 0
(hardly more difficult) to 100 (extremely more difficult) using
a slider. This value was encoded in a second variable.
Results
The frequencies of selections for the moral dilemma decision
tasks can be found in Fig. 1. In the first problem the same
number of participants rated either the Pregnancy Dilemma
or the Trolley Problem to be the more difficult one. In the sec-
ond problem 38 participants decided the Pregnancy Dilemma
to be the more difficult decision scenario while 22 partici-
pants chose the Boat Dilemma. In the third problem 44 par-
ticipants opted for the Trolley Dilemma and 16 for the Boat
Dilemma. A two-tailed binomial test was used to compare
the frequencies for the dichotomous variable.
As predicted, no reliable difference in the evaluation of
the difficulty of the moral dilemmas Pregnancy and Runaway
Figure 1: Frequencies in the evaluation of the moral dilemma
difficulty between two tasks (∗ ≤ .05, ∗∗∗ ≤ .001).
Table 1: Mean values for the participants rating of the
difficulty to find a decision in the selected scenario.
Meandifficulty
Decision Task PW RT OB
PW–RT M = 72.37SD = 28.37
M = 60.23
SD = 32.40
PW–OB M = 58.32SD = 32.48
M = 51.05
SD = 37.22
RT–OB M = 50.07SD = 32.99
M = 43.94
SD = 32.91
Note: PW: Pregnant Woman scenario; RT: Runaway Trolley
scenario; OB: Overweight Boat scenario
Trolley can be found (exact binomial test, two-sided, n.s.,
n = 60). There is a significant difference in the evaluation
of the moral dilemmas Pregnancy and Overweight Boat (ex-
act binomial test, two-sided, p ≤ .05, n = 60) and a signifi-
cant difference in the evaluation of the moral dilemmas Run-
away Trolley and Overweight Boat (exact binomial test, two-
sided, p ≤ .001, n = 60). Once more, Fig. 1 illustrates the
differences of difficulty per decision task. The mean values
of the participant’s rating of their personal difficulty to find
a decision in the previously selected scenario are shown in
Table 1. Subsequent two-tailed t-tests showed no significant
differences between the mean values MPW and MRT (decision
task PW–RT), MPW and MOB (decision task PW–OB), and
also not for MRT and MOB (decision task RT–OB) concerning
their rating of the subjective difficulty.
Discussion
As our theory predicted moral dilemmas can systematically
differ in their perceived difficulty: When asking about the
Pregnancy and Runaway Trolley dilemmas, as hypothesized,
no significant difference in the relative difficulty rating could
be identified. We explain this by the dilemmas’ same com-
plexity of the formal structure requiring a similar cognitive
effort. However, the questions concerning the decision dif-
ficulties between the ethical scenarios Pregnancy and Over-
weight Boat or the Runaway Trolley and Overweight Boat
resulted in reliable differences in the evaluation of the diffi-
culty of the moral decision situation. In both cases the Boat
Dilemma was selected reliably less often. These results sup-
port our theory of a different formal structure implying a dif-
ferent cognitive effort and therefore a lower complexity of the
Boat Dilemma.
Once the participants have selected the moral dilemma they
perceived to be more difficult (the dichotomous decision),
their subsequent rating of the difficulty in the interval from
0 to a 100 is statistically equal in comparison to the rating of
the participants who chose the other dilemma confirming the
result. Overall, there is a tendency towards a lower decision
difficulty in the Boat Dilemma.
General Discussion
The formally predicted distinction between Type 1 and Type 2
moral dilemmas have been empirically supported. Our results
support the theoretical assumption that less the dilemma’s
content but the formal structure and the associated cogni-
tive effort is a predicting factor affecting people’s rating of
a dilemmas’ difficulty. We recall that a main difference be-
tween moral dilemmas of Type 1 and Type 2 are either based
on action that the utilitarian choice does not or does Pareto
dominate the alternative choices. This connects the presented
formalism with ethical principles and a decision theoretic in-
terpretation. For Type 1 dilemmas, ethical principles predict
different sets of permissible actions, and hence there is a con-
flict to resolve which is not present for Type 2 dilemmas. The
absence of such a conflict appear at least on the problems’
surface to be easier to solve due to the lower cognitive ef-
fort they require. Further investigations ought to contain a
replication of the results with balanced materials and higher
sample sizes. In addition applying qualitative research such
as interviews or thinking aloud techniques may give deeper
insight in the complex human decision-making process par-
ticularly in morally difficult decision situations. This would
offer additional insights about the motives, thoughts, and con-
cepts people have when they have to solve tasks about moral
principles and can provide the reasons for their decisions. By
applying a qualitative content analysis of the different causal
structure of dilemmas may improve the detection and catego-
rization of the objective, systematic, and formal features of
the dilemma’s content. These categories in turn can be val-
idated by an assignment of dilemmas as a possible task in a
further experiment. Having a formal theory at hand allows
to systematically analyze the implications of the objectives,
concepts, and features relevant for moral decision making.
Our formalism is able to distinguish between moral dilem-
mas and—at least for the reported cases—predict a perceived
subjective difference between human raters.
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